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BOOK REVIEW
LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS AND PROFESSIONALISM:
EXAMINING THE OBVIOUS LINK
Michelle S. Friedman*
Book Review: Thad Kousser, Term Limits and the Dismantlingof State
Legislative Professionalism
Cambridge University Press (Dec. 2004), 275 pages, $70.00.
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed two sweeping
reforms that revolutionized the design of many U.S. state legislatures an increasing imposition of term limits and a notable shift toward
legislative professionalism.1 These aspects of a legislature's design serve
to implement its constituency's answers to some of the most fundamental
political questions.2 Among these questions are: "Whom do we want our
leaders to be? Should they be part-time lawmakers who take a turn in
government and then rejoin the populace? Or should they be professionals
who make governing their permanent career?" 3
In Term Limits and the Dismantling of State Legislative
Professionalism, Thad Kousser analyzes, through quantitative data
analysis and comprehensive examination of legislative records, how a
legislature's design affects the behavior of its members and the policies
they produce. Kousser finds that the imposition of term limits and the shift
toward professionalism have had countervailing effects on the stability of
legislative leadership,4 the distribution of legislative achievement,5 the
balance of power between the legislature and the governor,6 and the

* J.D., 2005, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S. Legal Studies, 2002, Nova
Southeastern University. Thanks to my family and friends for your encouragement and support, and
to the members of the University ofFloridaJournalofLaw & Public Policy for your patience and
dedication.
1. See generally THAD KOUSSER, TERM LIMITS AND THE DISMANTLING OF STATE
LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM 3-66 (2005); infra text accompanying notes 11-24.
2. See KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 3-4.
3. Id. at 3.
4. See id.at 69-92; infratext accompanying notes 31-32.
5. See KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 126-47; infra text accompanying note 35.
6. See KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 151-76; infra text accompanying notes 36-38.
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production of innovative policies.7 His ultimate conclusion is that the term
limits movement has virtually undone the achievements of
professionalization However, Kousser fails to acknowledge that undoing
the effects of legislative professionalism was the main goal of the term
limits movement,9 and this shortcoming profoundly undermines the impact
of his findings.
Professionalism, sometimes called careerism, ° measures the extent to
which a legislature provides its members the resources and support to
make their service a full-time profession." The three key components of
professionalism are a large number of staff aides, high member salaries,
and long annual sessions. 2 These institutional supports make legislative
careers more attractive and provide the capacity to make legislating a fulltime career.' 3 Before the 1960s, most state legislatures were part-time,
minimally supported bodies whose members were poorly compensated;
these legislatures are commonly labeled as "amateur" or "citizen" because
legislative service is not viewed as a profession. 4 The rise of legislative
professionalism that began in the 1960s, and continues today, was the
result of a popular desire to make state legislatures more internally stable,
and yet more responsive to social and economic change. 5 Kousser

7. See KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 177-202; infra text accompanying notes 39-41.
8. See KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 203, 213.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 25-30.
10. Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government in the American States: A Byproduct of
Legislative Professionalism?,88 AM. POL. Sa. REV. 304, 304 (1994).
11. See KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 12; Gerald Benjamin, Reform in New York: The Budget,
the Legislature,andthe GovernanceProcess,67 ALB. L. REV. 1021, 1031 (2004); see also Daniel
B. Rodriguez, Localism andLawmaking,32 RUTGERS L.J. 627,649 (2001) ("[P]rofessionalism may
be difficult to define precisely, but one key operational definition concerns whether state
legislatures are made up of professional politicians charged with the responsibility to meet regularly
and to conduct legislative business as their principal vocation."). To a certain extent,
professionalism is a measure of how much a state legislature looks like the highly professional U.S.
Congress. See KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 12.
12. KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 12; see Benjamin, supra note 11, at 1039; William D. Berry
et al., Legislative Professionalism and Incumbent Reelection: The Development of Institutional
Boundaries, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 859, 859 (2000) (referring to the "five S's" of a
professionalized legislature: space, salary, session length, staff, and structure); see also Wayne
Parent & Michael B. Henderson, The Party's Over: The Rise and Stall of Louisiana Legislative
Independence, 48 Loy. L. REV. 527, 536-37 (2002).
13. Benjamin, supra note 11, at 1042; see also Berry et al., supra note 12, at 860, 862-64.
14. Fiorina, supra note 10, at 306.
15. See KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 12-13; Benjamin, supra note 11, at 1031.
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classifies ten state legislatures as professional, 6 twelve as citizen, 7 and
twenty-eight as hybrid.' 8
The widespread imposition of term limits began in 1990 with initiative
campaigns in Oklahoma, California, and Colorado, and quickly reached
other states. 9 Legislative term limits can take the form of any law that
prevents legislators from serving for more than a given number of years
or terms.2" Term limits have been backed by strong public support, but
have not been popular among legislators themselves, who are reluctant to
shorten their own careers.2" As a result, proponents must work largely
through the initiative process, which provides state citizens with direct
participation, and term limits appear almost exclusively in states that allow
initiative lawmaking. 22 Today, sixteen states have term limits, 23 twentynine states have none, 24 and five states have overturned their limits by
legislative repeal or judicial action.25
The most commonly cited argument for the imposition of term limits
is that they prevent legislatures from being dominated by professional
politicians concentrated on attaining power. 26 Advocates sometimes argue
16. KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 15 (including California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin).
17. Id. (including Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
18. Id.(including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and Washington).
19. See id. at 9; John David Rausch, Jr., Understandingthe Term Limits Movement, in THE
TEST OF TIME: COPING WITH LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITs 225, 227-28 (Rick Farmer et al. eds.,
2003); Bruce E. Cain & Marc A. Levin, Term Limits, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 163, 165-66 (1999);
Steven F. Heufner, Term Limits in State Legislative Elections: Less Value for More Money?, 79
IND. L.J. 427, 428-29, 438-39 (2004).
20. See KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 7.
21. See id. at 8-9; Heufner, supra note 19, at 431-35.
22. See KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 9-10. Initiative lawmaking provides a mechanism for state
citizens to pursue their own interests directly by voting for or against a policy proposal. See
generally Rodriguez, supra note 11, at 662-73.
23. KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 11 (including Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, and Wyoming).
24. Id. (including Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
25. Id. (including Idaho, Massachusetts, Oregon, Utah, and Washington).
26. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitationsandthe Myth of the Citizen-Legislator,81
CORNELL L. REv. 623, 625-26 (1996) ("Activists argue that [the legislature] will no longer be the
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that term limits maintain balance between the legislative and executive
branches" and open legislative seats to women and minorities.28 But a
term limit is most often imposed as "a reaction to the development of
careers in state legislatures. '29 For example, in 1992 George Will argued
passionately for the imposition of term limits in Congress, asserting that
"only term limits can break the nexus between legislative careerists and
the capacity of the modem state to be bent to the service of their
careerism., 30 Similarly, state legislative term limits are often intended to
check the undesirable effects of legislative professionalism.
Kousser examines how increased professionalization and the
imposition of term limits have affected the form and function of state
legislatures, and concludes that in most areas the two reforms have had
countervailing effects. Kousser first considers how these two facets of a
legislature's design can change its internal organization and dynamics.
First, he finds that professionalization stabilizes legislative leadership,

domain of professionals whose long careers center on attaining and retaining powerful and
prestigious political offices."); id.
at 630-31 ("Term limits activists.., believe that [a professional
politician) inevitably acts in ways that are contrary to the public interest.... The solution to the
problem of careerists, activists argue, is to eliminate the incentives that encourage people to make
politics their profession and instead to fill Congress with citizen-legislators."); Heulher, supra note
19, at 432 ('Career' politicians are distrusted because of the perception that they are highly
ambitious and self-serving. In turn, their pursuit of this ambition is perceived as antithetical to the
public interest.").
27. See, e.g., GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS AND THE RECOVERY
OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 8-9 (1992).
28. See, e.g., Rhine L. McLin, The Hidden Effects of Term Limits: Losing the Voices of
Experience and Diversity, 32 U. TOL. L. REv. 539, 539 (2001).
29. Benjamin, supra note 11, at 1033; see Richard J. Powell, The UnintendedEffects ofTerm
Limits on the CareerPathsof State Legislators, in THE TEST OF TIME: COPING WITH LEGISLATIVE
TERM LIMITS, supranote 19, at 133 (describing term limits as the "antidote to the perceived ills of
increased professionalism"); Garrett, supranote 26, at 630-33; Heuffier, supra note 19, at 431-35.
See generally Cain & Levin, supra note 19, at 167-72 (outlining four normative perspectives progressivism, populism, republicanism, and libertarianism - on the relationship between term
limits and legislative professionalism).
30. WiL supra note 27, at 9. Will continued:
If people served in legislatures only briefly.., they would have less incentive to
shovel out pork .... [I]f legislators were not too separated, for too long, from
normal citizens and normal life in normal communities, they might retain the
ability to discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate functions for the
federal government.
Id. at 36.
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making it less susceptible to challenge by other members, 31 and that term
limits have the opposite effect, forcing leaders out of their positions and
encouraging challenges.32 Second, he observes that professionalization
leads to greater independence in legislative committees,3 3 while term limits
make committees less independent, respected, and active. 34 Finally,
Kousser discovers that term limits have a polarizing effect on the
distribution of legislative achievement.35
Kousser then examines how a legislature's design affects its external
functions. First, he investigates the effects of professionalization and term
limits on the balance of power between the legislature and the governor,
examining how variations in the legislature's institutional design might
alter its bargaining position.36 Kousser discovers that professionalization
strengthens the bargaining power of the legislature against the governor,37
while term limits weaken it and give the governor an advantage in
determining the state budget and the government's day-to-day
operations.38 Second, he analyzes the influence of legislative design on the

31. See KOUSSER, supranote 1, at 86-90,205-06; see also Benjamin, supranote 11, at 104446, 1049-50.
32. See KOUSSER, supranote 1, at 90-91, 205-06; see also Jennifer Drage Bowser et al., The
Impact of Term Limits on Legislative Leadership,in THE TEST OF TIME: COPING WITH LEGISLATIVE
TERM LIMTS, supra note 19, at 119-32; George Peery & Thomas H. Little, Views from the Bridge:
Legislative Leaders'Perceptionof InstitutionalPowerin the Stormy Wake of Term Limits, in THE
TEST OF TIME: COPING WITH LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS, supra note 19, at 105-18; Cain & Levin,
supra note 19, at 183-84; McLin, supra note 28, at 539-41. But see Garrett, supranote 26, at 66269 (explaining how legislators attain power and influence after term limits, even in the absence of
a strong seniority system).
33. See KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 112.
34. See id. at ll7.
35. Thus, those members who were most able to pass bills before term limits (i.e., members
of the majority party and legislative leaders in both parties) are even more able to do so following
the reform, while the opposite is true for those who were least able to pass bills before term limits
(i.e., legislators in the minority party and rank-and-file members of both parties). See id. at 144-47,
206-07; Thad Kousser, Term Limits and LegislatorPerformance,in THE TEST OF TIME: COPING
wrrH LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS, supra note 19, at 10 1-02.
36. See generally KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 151-76.
37. See id. at 172-76, 207.
38. See id. at 167-70, 176, 207; see also Rick Farmer et al., Introduction:Cluesfrom Term
Limits at Two, in THE TEST OF TIME: COPING WITH LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS, supra note 19, at
10 ("The original hypotheses about term limits tended to focus on shifting institutional power.
Evidence presented here indicates that institutional power is indeed shifting in the wake of term
limits. The governor and legislative staff have increased in importance."); Peery & Little, Views
from the Bridge: Legislative Leaders' Perception of InstitutionalPower in the Stormy Wake of
Term Limits, in THE TEST OF TIME: COPING WITH LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITs, supranote 19, at 117;
Benjamin, supra note 11, at 1047; Cain & Levin, supra note 19, at 182-83.
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production of innovative policies,39 by measuring the extent to which a
legislature takes new approaches and deviates from "federal defaults. 40
Kousser again concludes that professionalism and term limits have
countervailing effects: term limits reduce innovative policy production,
while professionalism increases it, each moving the level of innovation in
an opposite direction by approximately the same amount.41
Finally, Kousser sets forth his ultimate conclusion:
[T]here [is] a predictable pattern in the impact of legislative design
on America's states: Professionalization and term limits, the two
conflicting answers to the question of 'Whom do we want our
leaders to be?' bring countervailing effects.... [W]hatever a higher
level of professionalism produces more of, term limits has
reduced.42
Thus, term limits have a potent ability to "turn back the clock" on the
professionalization movement, counterbalancing its effects and narrowing
the gaps between professional and citizen legislatures. 43 Kousser
definitively observes that the term limit movement has unraveled the
reforms of professionalization: "[M]any of the changes brought by the
thirty-year project of professionalization in America's states have been
undone in a few sessions by term limits. . . . For better or worse,
legislatures that were redesigned by the professionalization movement
have been revolutionized again by term limits."
The fundamental flaw underlying Kousser's work is that he fails to
acknowledge the calculated nature of the relationship between the
professionalization and term limit reforms, or at least to mention that
undoing the effects of legislative professionalism was the main goal of the
term limits movement. 45 He displays a bias in his normative preference for

39. See generally KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 177-202.
40. See id. at 177-79, 195. "Innovative policy is simply whatever has not been tried before.
It is different: different from the status quo, from policies of the past, and from the choices of any
other government." Id. at 177. Kousser perceives the making of innovative policy as a function of
how legislators allocate their time between policy formulation and political activities; since
legislative design can refocus legislators' incentives and thus alter their allocation of time, it will
affect their ability to produce creative policies. See id. at 178-84.
41. See id. at 201-02, 207.
42. Id. at 203.
43. Id.;see id. at 213.
44. KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 213.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30. But see Garrett, supra note 26, at 694-97
(arguing that term limits are not effective in curbing legislative careerism).
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professional legislatures, and writes as though the imposition of term
limits had inadvertently destroyed the work of professionalization. But the
fact remains that legislative term limits are most often imposed to check
the undesirable effects of professionalism.' When balanced with this
understanding, Kousser's findings become tautological and unsurprising.
In the words of Daniel Rodriguez, "term limits naturally impact the
professionalism of state legislatures - indeed, they were intended by their
'
proponents to do exactly that."47
Against this background, Term Limits and the Dismantlingof State
Legislative Professionalismis best regarded as a simple evaluation of the
effectiveness of term limits in curtailing the effects of legislative
professionalism. For this purpose the book is both competent and effective,
although it may not be useful for lay readers who lack the background
knowledge that a proper understanding of the work requires. However, it
will prove invaluable for political scientists, legislative scholars, and
others who are familiar with the reforms of professionalization and term
limits.

46. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
47. Rodriguez, supra note 11, at 649.
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